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A B S T R A C T
Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) are central to healthcare decision-making in Britain and abroad, yet their
history is poorly understood. In this paper, we argue that a more in-depth and political history of the QALY is
needed to allow a critical evaluation of its current dominance. Exploiting rich data from archives and 44 semi-
structured interviews conducted between 2015 and 2018, we employ Multiple Streams Analysis to construct a
complex and dynamic picture of how the idea of QALYs emerged and was adopted within UK health policy.
Through its historical and political approach, the paper illuminates the relative roles in the policy-making
process of experts (especially economists) and politicians as ‘entrepreneurs’ in the development of new ideas;
how these were inﬂuenced by negotiation within established and emerging institutional structures; and the role
of serendipity and crisis.
1. Introduction
The Quality-Adjusted Life-Years (QALYs) measurement – a tool
developed to evaluate the cost-eﬀectiveness of treatments – is central to
healthcare decision-making in Britain – where it forms the basis of the
work of the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) –
and in many other countries. The ﬁrst use of the term ‘QALY’ is con-
tested (Cohen, 1998). In the US and Canada in the late 1960s, the op-
erational research (OR) community contributed to debates on Quality-
of-Life (QoL) questions. Klarman et al. (1968) published a key article
articulating the idea of the QALY whilst Bush et al. (1972) were the ﬁrst
to use the term ‘QALY’ (see also Weinstein and Stason, 1977;
Zeckhauser and Shephard, 1976). There were also seminal contribu-
tions from the evidence-based medicine group at McMaster led by
Torrance et al. (1972).
There are multiple deﬁnitions of QALYs. This paper uses NICE's
deﬁnition of “[a] measure of the state of health of a person or group in
which the beneﬁts, in terms of length of life, are adjusted to reﬂect the
quality of life” (NICE, 2016). QALYs bring together morbidity and
mortality in a single ratio to evaluate the outcome of health interven-
tions. It is variously referred to as an ‘index’, ‘tool’ or ‘measurement’.
Although it is now a widespread concept, the history of the QALY re-
mains obscured and/or often simpliﬁed. We suggest that this is due to
two factors: previous histories have been written by non-historians, and
they have not exploited archival source analysis or oral history.
What is needed is a more rigorous history of the QALY, emphasising
the political economy of its emergence and subsequent adoption within
health policy and decision-making. This is necessary to support debates
on whether QALYs are the best available tools for decision-making and
how they might contribute to, or hinder, the goal of equity in health-
care (Knapp, 2015). If the current and future use of QALYs is to be
eﬀectively analysed, it is vital to understand how and why they became
so essential to policy-makers and health service professionals. This
paper blends conventional historical research methodologies – archival
analysis and oral history – with political science. We use Kingdon's
(1984; 1993) Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) which enables the
construction of complex and dynamic explanations of how policy ideas
‘catch on’, combining notions of policy entrepreneurs, streams, and
negotiation/bargaining.
The paper is organised as follows: we review the available literature
on the history of the QALY and propose a framework highlighting the
politics and wider context of its formulation and implementation. The
research methods are discussed, before we construct a history of the
QALY by articulating Kingdon's streams. We conclude by discussing the
importance of critical historical research for eﬀective health policy
development.
2. Developing a critical history of QALYs
Our initial literature review on the history of QALYs identiﬁed
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remarkably few sources, most of which had been written by economists.
These sources tend to present a partial history in which there is little
discussion of the interaction between research and policy (Hurst, 1998;
Kind, 2005; Williams, 2005). Some oﬀer good historical accounts but
often from one person's view (Rosser, 1993; Williams, 2005; also Ryan
and Gerard, 2014 on Mooney's contribution). Other sources have fo-
cused on the contributions of disciplines other than health economics,
QALY theory (Coast, 2018; Forget, 2004; Gold et al., 2002), or its ap-
plication in specialised areas such as renal dialysis (Cohen, 1998;
Holland, 1991; Stanton, 1999). Medical sociologists provide a useful
history of QoL measures and their social dimension but here again there
is no in-depth discussion of the policy context (Armstrong et al., 2007).
Some develop detailed accounts but lack a political or policy dimension
(Ashmore et al., 1989; Blaug 1998; Harris, 1987; Nord, 2001; Williams,
1985b). The most interesting sociological approach is probably Wahl-
berg and Rose's international analysis of a range of quality of life
measurements (Wahlberg and Rose, 2015).
Our analysis combines political theory with history. Historians have
only recently begun to investigate the potential of such methodologies
for their traditional materials, but it is promising (Gorsky and Millward,
2017). For this case study, we found Kingdon's Multiple Streams Ana-
lysis (MSA) (1984) particularly relevant for examining the complex
QALY history. It posits three diﬀerent ‘streams’ – policy, politics, and
problems – where ideas ﬂoat, and which merge together to open a
window of opportunity, through the negotiating work of policy en-
trepreneurs.
The policy stream (in Fig. 1) is where policy ideas are formulated
within what Kingdon calls a competitive primeval soup where ideas
compete and the ‘ﬁttest’ survive. Ideas ‘ﬂoat’ within policy communities
and networks composed of think-tanks, academic centres, civil servants,
political parties or Select Committees. The survival of ideas depends on
three criteria: value acceptability, technical feasibility, and network
integration (ideas will be debated in diﬀerent networks and commu-
nities with diﬀerent levels of competition and openness impacting on
the potential growth of the idea). The problem stream is where issues
emerge, based on indicators such as low economic growth or rising
costs of care, and focusing events which catch popular attention. It also
responds to ‘load eﬀect’, in which policy innovation is a response to the
multiplication or heightening of several problems. The politics stream is
where individuals such as politicians and civil servants evaluate the
national mood and pressure groups' support for an idea, based on the
contemporary political context, including factors such as recent elec-
tions, arrival of newly elected politicians and opinion polls.
Kingdon also describes the roles of individuals or institutions as
policy entrepreneurs, or “surfers waiting for the right wave” (Kingdon,
1984, p.173). Entrepreneurs inﬂuence policy-making by bringing to-
gether the three streams around a speciﬁc issue. Entrepreneurs may be
found in all three streams, and often move between these streams. Once
the streams have been coupled by entrepreneurs, a brief and un-
predictable window of opportunity opens, “for advocates of proposals to
push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems”
(Kingdon, 1993). These political science analytical frameworks are not
routinely used within health services research: only three articles were
found speciﬁcally articulating MSA for a health problem (McMillin,
2014; Shapiro et al., 2017; Whiteford et al., 2016). However, MSA
presents clear advantages for understanding complex cases of inter-
twined interests and individuals such as we see with QALYs. We criti-
cally applied MSA to make sense of individuals, ideas and wider phe-
nomena, iteratively applying concepts alongside the rich data collected
to achieve the best possible explanation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007).
Rather than these streams being integrated into how interview ques-
tions were formulated, the process was more iterative, with questions
focusing on a number of issues around the emergence, growth and in-
ﬂuence of health economics. Only during the analysis did the theme of
QALYs and the potential for analysing this speciﬁc issue through MSA
emerged. Then followed a dialogue between the theory and the em-
pirical data to develop the best possible explanation for the emergence
of QALYs.
3. Methods
We collected archival material from various sources, including the
National Archives (TNA), uncatalogued Department of Health ﬁles (80
from TNA; 50 ﬁles from DH Burnley) and from University of York ar-
chives. Ethical approval guaranteeing conﬁdentiality and data protec-
tion was obtained to conduct semi-structured oral history interviews
with 44 participants, mostly UK-based retired and practising academics
and civil servants. These interviews were recorded digitally, fully
transcribed and, where requested, anonymised. These are referred to as
civil servants (CS and number) and academics (A and number).
Participants were asked about their understanding of the emergence of
QALYs, the role played by Government and possible alternatives. To
gauge the awareness of the British medical profession in the discipline
of health economics, British Medical Journal (BMJ) papers between
1930 and 1990 were searched using the keyword ‘health economics’
(n= 385) via access to a trial text mining project based at the
University of Manchester. For the speciﬁc concept of QALYs, the BMJ
and the Lancet were searched for the period 1960 and 1999 (n= 345).
This demonstrated ﬁrst uses of the term QALY from 1984 (BMJ) and
1985 (Lancet). Secondary literature on the development of health
economics was also collected (Croxson, 1998; Hurst, 1998; Smee,
2005). These data were coded in NVivo 11, using broad themes such
QoL, creation, actors, relations, resistance, and competition from other
disciplines/groups. These themes, and later codes, were adapted as
each source was re-read.
4. The formulation of the QALY concept in the UK
Here, we construct a history of the QALY by characterising the three
streams.
4.1. The problem stream
The British National Health Service, founded in 1948, is a universal
system in which healthcare is free at the point of delivery and funded
through central government taxation. Historically, until the creation of
the NHS Management Executive in 1989, it was managed via the
Ministry of Health, later replaced by the Department of Health and
Social Security (DHSS) in 1968, and the Department of Health (DH) in
1988. There has always been political accountability for the NHS in
Parliament through the Secretary of State for Health, who is advised byFig. 1. Multiple Streams Analysis schema (based on Zahariadis, 2014).
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permanent, non-political civil servants, and, since the late 1960s, by
temporary special advisers.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UK experienced economic
shocks, including the international OPEC oil crisis. The cost of health-
care increased because of a number of factors. These included the ex-
pense of innovations in health technology such as organ transplants and
renal dialysis, and the impact of an ageing population, who had more
healthcare needs. Between 1960 and 1982, average real-term spending
on healthcare ranged from 3.9% to 5.9% of GDP, with two clear in-
creases during the mid-1970s (Health Foundation, 2015). There were
also raised expectations about the quality and availability of care for
what may have been seen as relatively insigniﬁcant needs in the early
years of the NHS (Smith, 1987). One handwritten DHSS memorandum
from 1970 remarked that “the more people we keep alive, the more it
will cost the service” (TNA, BN13.197). The concerns about the viabi-
lity of the NHS have been present from its creation and regularly sur-
faced through investigations such as the Guillebaud Committee on the
cost of the NHS (1953–1956) and the Hinchcliﬀe Committee on the cost
of prescribing (1957–1959). There was however a clear increase in
attention from the late 1960s, stimulating studies on eﬃciency and
cost-eﬀectiveness. The ﬁrst major reorganisation of the NHS in 1974
was one result of this chronic concern. However, it did not solve the
issue, and a series of crises, including staﬀ strikes and lengthening
waiting lists contributed to a sense of ‘problem’. Market solutions such
as willingness-to-pay or demand versus cost were not appropriate in
this universal, state provided system. A modiﬁed form of ‘rationing’ was
introduced through the economics-inspired Resource Allocation
Working Party (RAWP) formula in 1976, which attempted to redis-
tribute the budget to areas with greater need.
Furthermore the ‘machine’ of government was increasingly subject
to scrutiny, especially the issue of eﬃciency and value for money. The
Plowden and Fulton reports (1961 and 1968 respectively) proposed a
greater role for research and expertise in policy-making. The Treasury
and the DHSS demanded greater accountability for outputs. However
measuring outputs in health was notoriously diﬃcult compared to areas
such as defence or transport (Colvin, 1985). Kingdon's ‘load eﬀect’ was
emerging, as multiple problems were layered on top of each other. For
Rudolf Klein, these crises and reforms “transformed the language in
which every issue was debated” within the NHS. Now economics was
enabling “non-numerate people like me to talk about issues like cost-
beneﬁt analysis” (Interview, 2016).
There were speciﬁc ’focusing events' that helped economists to ar-
ticulate problems. Alan Williams and Alan Maynard, pioneering aca-
demic health economists at the University of York, used stories of pa-
tients generating huge media coverage to highlight the inadequate
setting of priorities in the NHS. In 1986, Maynard drew attention to the
considerable sum of money spent on new-born babies in intensive care,
while thousands of (usually elderly) patients were awaiting cheaper
interventions such as hip replacements (Ashmore et al., 1989,
pp.60–81). Economists oﬀered “a more standardised approach of
looking at cost-eﬀectiveness analysis” (CS7). However, an analytical
tool was not available to assist with making such choices:
there were questions like the DH could stop doing routine screenings
for TB, but the DH didn't have a mechanism like NICE to recommend
to the NHS that they should do certain things. (A3)
4.2. The policy stream
Quality of Life (QoL) – refers to philosophical, medical and socio-
logical debates over whether and how to attribute diﬀerent values to
diﬀerent lives and diﬀerent health states. Measurements of QoL became
a research focus in the clinical/medical community during the 1940s
and 1950s (Cohen, 1998; Costanza et al., 2007). Medical professionals
combined morbidity and mortality data into tools such as the Not-
tingham Health Proﬁle and the Karnofsky index (Gudex, 1986).
International organisations such as the World Health Organisation
(WHO) were also interested in QoL from the perspective of population
health measurement, which traditionally relied on population surveys
(WHO, 1957; Sheard, 2013). Other communities such as academic
philosophers (Harris, 1987; Koch, 2000), OR, evidence-based medicine
(Torrance et al., 1972) and transport economics (Jones-Lee, 1976) were
interested in the QoL question (cf. MacKillop, 2017).
Earlier in the 1960s, researchers had become interested in stan-
dardising the description of individuals' health states and scoring them
in order to rank them on a scale of severity (Katz et al., 1963), although
some studies moved towards devising comprehensive models based on
mathematics, such as those combining morbidity and mortality
(Chiang, 1965). From the late 1960s, a ﬁnal key move was made to-
wards cardinal measurements to order states of illness as well as
quantify their undesirability (see Rosser, 1983).
In parallel to the North American research mentioned above, British
researchers had also been active in the 1960s in devising outcome
measurement in health. During his secondment to the Treasury in
1966–1968, Alan Williams authored a paper for the Centre of Economic
Studies on outcome measurement (A3). In 1971, three economists at
the University of York – Tony Culyer, Bob Lavers and Alan Williams –
had described the idea combining painfulness and restricted activity,
representing it in a diagram (TNA, MH166/927). This paper was cited
by several of our interviewees as ground-breaking (e.g. CS1; A2). One
government economist noted:
Now that was a revelation to me and I remember looking at that and
thinking ‘yes! That's what we're trying to do! That's outcomes!’
(Jeremy Hurst, Interview)
Archives indicate that, in the 1970s, DHSS economists began to take
an interest in how other departments approached the question of
“comparative cost eﬀectiveness of life saving” (e.g. TNA, AT82/11,
Economic value of life: examination of methods of evaluating life for cost
beneﬁt analysis of road and railway safety projects, 1 January 1971, p.2).
There was disagreement among government economists over which
form of valuation to adopt. Gavin Mooney, then an economist at the
Department for the Environment, favoured the “Jones-Lee metho-
dology” of valuation to measure attitudes to risk, combined with a
behavioural approach, as advocated by Martin Feldstein – a US econ-
omist who had completed his PhD research on the NHS at the
University of Oxford in 1967 (TNA, AT82/11, p.3). The Economic
Advisers' Oﬃce was created in DHSS in 1968, with just two economists,
David Pole and Jeremy Hurst, appointed in 1970 to work on health
policy (there are now 54 economists working in DH, DH email ex-
change). Later Norman Glass joined them, working on methods to es-
timate NHS costs of road traﬃc accidents in 1975–76 (TNA, MH148/
579, Estimation of cost to the National Health Service of road traﬃc acci-
dents and recuperation of costs through insurance companies: proposals,
drafts, statistics and correspondence, 1 January 1975).
Culyer, Lavers and Williams's research was limited to theory but
there was a British researcher making progress in the ﬁeldwork. Rachel
Rosser was a Professor of Psychiatry at University College London/
Middlesex University. From early 1970s, she developed her ‘sanative
output’ measures for hospital patients, working with her husband, the
operational researcher Vincent Watts. These measurements aimed at
evaluating whether a hospital stay had improved a patient's health and
to what extent relative to full health (Rosser and Watts, 1972). Rosser
used qualitative methods for evaluating these health states such as in-
terviewing patients and their doctors. But her research failed to attract
enough attention from researchers and policy-makers to support its
development into a potential policy tool.
To understand the slow maturation of QALY as an accepted outcome
measurement, it is necessary to understand the growth of economics
within Government, which Jeremy Hurst observed ﬁrst hand (Hurst,
1998). Until 1964, when the Government Economic Service (GES) was
created – a Treasury body that recruited economists for deployment
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across Departments –, few economists worked in Whitehall (Allan,
2008). When Wilson's Labour government was elected in 1964, only 25
full-time economists were employed. Five years later, there were just
under 200 and this number doubled between 1970 and 1977. It was in
this more welcoming environment that economics became increasingly
present and thus its language and tools became more familiar and po-
tentially useable to non-economist civil servants and politicians (Davis,
1998, p.5).
In the DHSS Pole and Hurst emphasised the need for more eco-
nomics, the former explaining that Government economists should “do
anything we can to stimulate an interest in and the use of cost-eﬀec-
tiveness analysis” (TNA, BN155/4, EAO NHS: Economic Analysis,
‘Economic appraisal’, 18 May 1972). They also advocated broadening
the impact of diﬀerent types of economic analysis on health policy. Pole
had conducted an economic evaluation of “routine radiography to de-
tect TB” when working at Cardiﬀ in 1969, so when he moved to DH,
“economic evaluation was on his list of things that he knew about”
(A2). Economists outside DH also informed contemporary policy issues.
For example, from 1971, the York-based economist Peter West con-
ducted a study on the cost of teaching hospitals which directly informed
DH policy (CS1; CS4; A2). Research on QoL measurements and other
areas was enabling economists and other researchers to develop ‘usable
tools’ for DH economists:
The importance of the early cooperative work on QoL measurement
is that it led to a usable British and now European health outcome
measure, the QALY. (Jeremy Hurst, interview)
Government economists were increasingly called upon by the ‘Top
of the Oﬃce’ (senior civil servants) in DHSS to apply their analytical
skills to an increasing number of topics such as providing criteria for
priority setting major capital schemes in District General Hospitals
(TNA, BN155.5.2, EAO, Meeting on morbidity indices, 4 December
1972). Thus, economic analyses, especially cost-eﬀectiveness analysis,
became embedded in DHSS.
Ministerial support was critical to securing the inﬂuence of econo-
mists in DHSS and making the QALY politically palatable. Barbara
Castle (Secretary of State for Health and Social Services, 1974–1976),
her junior Minister of Health, David Owen (1974–1976), and high-
ranking civil servants, such as Douglas Black (Chief Scientist,
1973–1977), were enthusiastic about economics and how it could in-
form health (Williams, 2005). Their support was apparent to econo-
mists themselves, both within DHSS and academia:
I think the economists within the DH had a bit of a golden period.
They obviously had the ear of particular ministers. Some ministers
would be more interested in it than others. I think David Owen was
one who was particularly interested but perhaps not the only one. I
think it was about the power of the economists in DH (A2)
Yet there were some within DHSS who were not immediate converts
to health economics, especially within the medical civil service. An
interviewee recalled an economist who had proposed ways of mea-
suring health outcomes being “hauled up before the Chief Medical
Oﬃcer” (CS1; also reference in CS2).
Kingdon's policy stream also requires an assessment of the technical
feasibility of the emerging policy idea. For the QALY, there were a
number of academics struggling with developing instruments for health
outcome measurement that were technically feasible. Rosser and Watts
continually reﬁned their own methodologies, moving from evaluating
health states, notably distress and disability, based on legal awards for
personal injuries and industrial accidents and diseases (Rosser and
Watts, 1975), to collecting qualitative data from interviews with pa-
tients and health professionals and survey questionnaires to reﬁne these
health states into workable scales (Rosser and Watts, 1974; Rosser and
Kind, 1978). A signiﬁcant breakthrough came with the developments in
Information Technology (IT) with computer scientists turned econo-
mists such as Paul Kind becoming able to collect health statuses and
compare them on a much greater scale than doing so by hand. Ac-
cording to one interviewee involved in the development of QALYs, the
biggest challenges in making the Rosser-Watts index applicable were
“methodology and getting reliable data” and “talking to clinicians”
about the assumptions being made by these researchers (A8), all of
which required intensive research and consultation. For his part, Martin
Buxton, who attempted to use an earlier form of this index in the heart
transplant evaluation (Buxton, 1987), found that although it was “a
useful [and] important step in the process of getting to QALYs”, it was
too “crude” at the time because the weights were “not patient or po-
pulation weights that one could rely on” (Martin Buxton, Interview).
For several of our interviewees, making the QALY ‘usable’ in health was
easier once it was a workable tool:
I think if we never had the methodology for doing these things it
would have been more diﬃcult, but I think it was easy to once you
had the methodology and you found a policy hook and then there it
went. (A2)
Kingdon's policy stream also requires an assessment of how the idea
was integrated within distinct networks and communities. The QALY
concept was weakly integrated until the 1970s, with non-academics and
those outside Rosser and Watt's network of researchers unaware of their
ideas. This may be linked to the absence of a network such as the Health
Economists' Study Group (HESG) which, from 1972, brought together
academics, government economists and others into sharing ideas and
research (Croxson, 1998). Williams felt that the main drawback was
that “the measurement scales were rather idiosyncratic, and diﬃcult to
interpret”, using maximum values (for perfect health) of 497, a ﬁgure
which did not correspond to anything obvious (Williams, 2005, p.4).
Rosser and Williams met in the mid-1970s and began working to-
gether. In a key breakthrough in 1982, Williams proposed the in-
tegration of measures of quality of life with those of life expectancy to
“capture the essence of a person's healthiness” (Williams, 2005, p.3). He
also proposed the now conventional 0 to 1 scale (Kind et al., 1982). To
further increase the ‘palatability’ of the idea, the “somewhat awkward
term ‘sanitative output’” was dropped in favour of a simpler one: the
Rosser or Rosser-Kind index (Kind, 1998, p.655).
Several applications helped to ‘soften up’ or normalise the QALY
approach by demonstrating how it could help inform real NHS decision-
making. We here focus on two. Williams was invited to attend a con-
sensus development conference on Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting
(CABG) organised by doctors in November 1984. He discussed “the
costs and beneﬁts of competing technologies” which, for the medical
members of the panel, was “a novel challenge” (Jennett, 1985, p.717).
According to Jeremy Hurst, then Senior Economic Adviser in DHSS, this
was “a breakthrough moment, especially in relation to getting the ac-
ceptance of the doctors for QALYs” (Interview). In 1985, Williams
(1985a) published a paper in the BMJ on CABG. This put economics
into easily understood language for clinicians and demonstrated the
opportunity cost of this surgical technique relative to other possible
clinical interventions. Williams formulated a league table of treatments
for angina, and used QALYs to rank them, using also data from Martin
Buxton's recent economic analysis on heart transplant. Because there
was little data available on the cost and outcomes of these interven-
tions, the Economic Advisers' Oﬃce helped with costing, highlighting
the importance of the early collaboration between DH and academia in
the formulation of QALYs. Williams was asked by doctors during the
conference: “how would you as an economist tell us whether we are
doing too much or too little about heart surgery” (A2). He therefore
included wider interventions such as bypass surgery, heart transplants
and hip replacements and GP promotion of smoking cessation in the
prototype QALY league table. This formed a key moment in opening a
window of opportunity for QALYs, when it was combined by Williams
and others with the issue of the growing cost of healthcare.
The second key development in ‘softening up’ the policy community
to using QALYs came the following year. In 1986, Anne Ludbrook, a
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York-trained health economist who had moved to Health Economics
Research Unit (HERU) at Aberdeen in 1983, was invited by the DHSS to
be a member of the Forrest Commission on breast cancer screening. The
Commission's report, published in 1986, was one of the ﬁrst to re-
commend calculating the economic cost per QALY for screening for
speciﬁc health conditions. According to an Economic Advisers' Oﬃce
economist, until then, the cost per QALY approach was “very much a
side show in the Department, even among the economists”, as the re-
source allocation issue took priority (CS4). The Forrest Commission was
established to decide whether screening for breast cancer should be
introduced for all women across the UK. As there was no useful UK
data, the Commission used US and Swedish studies as well as small UK
pilots. Ludbrook presented evidence in favour of screening using a life
expectancy versus quality graph. The Commission was convinced, “so
long as they got a number that they could use as the base estimate”
(A1). However, it has been suggested by interviewees that a political
decision had already been taken to introduce UK-wide breast screening
(with support from Health Minister Edwina Currie) and that the
Commission was a post-hoc justiﬁcation exercise. This illustrates the
sometimes diﬃcult relationship between policy and subject-matter ex-
perts (Weiss, 1977).
There were other signiﬁcant studies, such as Martin Buxton's 1987
DHSS-commissioned research on the cost-eﬀectiveness of heart trans-
plants but the Rosser index was not used here (see interview above). In
these projects and others during the 1980s, such as the Measurement
and Valuation of Health (MVH) programme run at York with Alan
Williams, Paul Kind and Claire Gudex, economists and medical pro-
fessionals collaborated with central government and local health au-
thorities to help, as one interviewee put it, to “convert” clinicians and
managers to the idea of QALYs (A8). Rather than a ‘breakthrough
moment’, the building of research networks was crucial in spreading the
idea of QALYs across diﬀerent environments. Furthermore, medical
research grants increasingly required an integral economic component
especially for epidemiological studies. Economics was so well en-
trenched here that one interviewee remarked that “QALYs could have
come from epidemiology” (A9).
Within two years of Williams' CABG paper in the BMJ, there was
suﬃcient public awareness of the concept, and concern about its use,
that academic health economists found themselves with an opportunity
to ‘soften up’ public and political acceptance of QALYs. Newspaper
headlines such as ‘Who lives and who dies’, “A game of chance” (The
Times, 21 December 1987) and “Health care roulette” (The Guardian, 5
November 1986) (Ashmore et al., 1989, pp.70–71) were growing. On
16 October 1986, Maynard appeared on Dimbleby's ‘This Week’ on ITV
to discuss QALYs with a neonatal intensive care doctor. The same week,
he took part in an ITV game show entitled ‘The Life and Death Game’,
which used ideas of priority-setting and opportunity costs (Ashmore
et al., 1989). In ‘The Heart of the Matter’ on BBC One in October 1986,
a ﬁctional health authority was given £200,000 for its population, and
had to decide whether “it would get 10 QALYs from dialysis of kidney
patients, 266 QALYs from hip-replacement operations or 1197 QALYs
from anti-smoking messages” (Harris, 1987).
4.3. The politics stream
The third of Kingdon's ‘streams’ relates to politics. During the 1970s,
public conﬁdence in the NHS appeared unshakeable but relatively un-
spoken. Various British politicians, both left and right-wing, have re-
peatedly emphasised the value and security of the NHS. Nigel Lawson,
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer (1983–89) called it “the
closest thing the English have to a religion” (Lawson, 1992, p.613). Any
proposal to introduce further payments in the NHS or to change its
ﬁnancing would be politically risky, as Margaret Thatcher's cautious
attitude towards the NHS from 1979 suggested. Policy-makers had to
reﬂect on how decisions around treatments were made. Politics implies
negotiation and competition over how society should be organised and
ruled, and this here includes negotiations between clinicians and health
service managers. Clinical autonomy in decision-making prevailed but
was under attack using economics principles – an irony given that
clinicians could claim they had always had to make diﬃcult choices in
patient care. For economists, it was wrong that a patient was given
treatment without active consideration of whether it would beneﬁt
them more than another patient, or whether giving them treatment
would deprive other potential patients of other treatments (‘opportu-
nity cost’ in economic parlance). Yet this clinical autonomy over patient
management was being eroded. As resources became increasingly
strained, waiting lists and times for elective care increased, and length
of in-patient stays shortened, economists such as Williams pushed for
new ideas, suggesting clinical management reforms were required:
[D]octors' specialist skills lie in their ability to diagnose and to know
the eﬀects of various courses of action which might then be adopted;
and in their ability to implement […] whichever course of action the
patient selects. They have no legitimate claim to impose their
judgments about the relative valuations of diﬀerent courses of ac-
tion upon their patients. (Williams 1985b, p.6; Sheard 2018)
The health economics discourse surrounding QALYs supported this
opening-up of clinical management to new ideas. As one government
economist interviewed put it: “it is about exposing the consequences of
the decisions and the inherent inconsistency that those decisions can
lead to” (CS7). An academic economist involved in NHS decision-
making noted how QALYs revolutionised the assessment of NHS care:
Alan [Williams] used to describe it so nicely: ‘vertical and hor-
izontal’. People left hospital alive or dead. Literally. The statistics
were dead or discharged. And all the medical stuﬀ was about sur-
vival and not QoL and so it was a huge step forward. (A1)
One of the ﬁrst health economists involved in QALY research noted
in interview that it “was really uphill work” and that there was sig-
niﬁcant clinical “resistance to the idea of QALYs” (A10). Another re-
searcher involved in the development of the QALY explained how the
York MVH team in the late 1980s worked with “the minority [of clin-
icians] who were interested in doing this and dared to do it because it
was a big thing” (A8). Alliances between economists and speciﬁc
medical professionals and health authorities to trial QALYs were vital in
building support across the three streams and for a policy change.
Budding relationships and tensions between economists and med-
ical professionals are illuminated through a review of the Lancet and the
BMJ for the period 1984 to 1999. Some doctors appeared to be
warming to the idea of a QoL-type measurement to allocate health re-
sources, albeit still disputing QALYs per se. For instance, David Grimes,
a doctor at Blackburn Inﬁrmary, acknowledged in the Lancet in 1987
that ineﬃciencies resulted from rationing being “left to doctors”
(Grimes, 1987, p.615). Grimes suggested that QALYs could help make
decision-making more open by allowing “lay members of health au-
thorities to decide how to spend their inadequate amounts of money in
a way that gives the greatest beneﬁt to society” (Grimes, 1987, p.615.).
The epidemiologist Alwyn Smith wrote an article for the Lancet under
the title ‘Qualms about QALYs’ (Smith, 1987, p.1135). Although he
supported the health economists' view that there were “more poten-
tially beneﬁcial health-care procedures than we have resources to carry
out” and a lack of data to inform decision-making, he judged QALYs
unfeasible because of the great philosophical and theoretical diﬃculties
that would come from having to decide which patient to treat. Ac-
cording to a researcher involved in developing the QALY alongside
clinicians, clinicians underestimated how far-reaching QALYs would
become:
[S]ome of the clinicians could have been a bit sceptical but they
gave information and were interested in what it could bring. I don't
think there was ever … any idea that this was going to be the way
that they were going to make decisions. (A8)
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It is this budding relationship that eventually led some economists,
medical professionals and NHS managers to setting-up what may be
termed the precursors of NICE, the Development and Evaluation
Committees (DECs) from 1991, in which QALYs were operationalised,
bringing together “a group of the health authorities trying to make
decisions on what technologies, in the widest sense, to invest in their
patch” (Ron Akehurst, witness seminar organised on 27 October 2017
on the development of health economics). Similar groups appeared in
the Trent region and later the West Midlands, and a growing number of
treatment and technology evaluations became commissioned from
economists. Despite these DECs and other similar groups in other parts
of the UK, Timmins, Rawlins and Appleby note the limitations of these
frameworks in mainstreaming QALY-type evaluations until NICE:
Valuable though their work was, however, it had limited ﬁre power.
It remained well short of a nationally authoritative voice re-
commending what the NHS should or should not adopt, and it did
not prevent the controversy over the so-called ‘postcode lottery’.
(Timmins et al. 2016, p.30)
4.4. Policy entrepreneurs
The previous sections have applied Kingdon's Multiple Stream
Analysis (MSA) to demonstrate that in all three areas – problem, policy
and politics – there were favourable conditions to support the adoption
of the QALY as a new tool within British healthcare policy. MSA also
makes possible an assessment of the role of individuals as policy ‘en-
trepreneurs’ in achieving ‘take-oﬀ’ – brokering the transition from
emerging idea to full implementation. We here focus on two central
actors/groups in the development of the QALY: Alan Williams and the
role of the Economic Advisers' Oﬃce.
Alan Williams is routinely seen as a pioneer of British health eco-
nomics, and indeed his arrival at the then-new University of York in
1964 marked the start of an ambitious programme for the new dis-
cipline of health economics. Williams embodies the idea of policy en-
trepreneur, being mentioned by all our interviewees as crucial. One of
our interviewees noted that “a lot of it comes down to personalities …
Alan was very strong and he had a huge network” (A8). He also appears
to have been open to learning about diﬀerent intellectual environments.
He worked at US universities in 1957–1958 and 1963–1964 and un-
dertook a secondment as an economist in the British civil service be-
tween 1966 and 1968. This was crucial in enabling him to understand
the tortuous process of policy formation. As our interviewees noted,
Williams was skilled at translating his and other academics' ideas into a
format that policy-makers understood. Although the QALY concept was
already in development (through the work of Rosser and Watts, and
others), it was when Williams became aware of its potential that he was
able to make the concept more palatable, softening it up to make it
understandable to a lay and policy audience. Williams was also a well-
connected academic who interacted with policy, medical and academic
worlds so that he was aware of their demands and values. When poli-
tical attention shifted to NHS costs and eﬃciency, economists such as
Williams were ready and willing to frame policy solutions in ways that
resonated with government interests. For example, in 1986, Williams
was one of the founding members of the QoL Measurement Group in
partnership with colleagues from Brunel and Middlesex Universities,
and which included the government economists Clive Smee and Jeremy
Hurst (A3; A8), which further developed QALYs, notably by generating
further data and reﬁning the model. This eventually led to the forma-
tion of the EuroQoL group in 1993 (Kind, 1998). At the local level, Alan
Williams also pushed for the employment of health economists by Re-
gional Health Authorities (RHAs) to facilitate the implementation
QALYs (A1; 2; 3).
The Economic Advisers' Oﬃce was also a central policy en-
trepreneur in the development and reﬁnement of QALYs. Government
economists David Pole, Jeremy Hurst and later Clive Smee, routinely
consulted with academic colleagues and attended conferences, such as
the one held at York in 1970 which helped to persuade the government
to allocate an initial £20,000 grant to York (CHE Archives, Letter from
JD Pole to Jack Wiseman, 3 August 1971) and later HESG meetings. As
one DH economist described, the culture within the Economic Advisers'
Oﬃce during the 1970s-1980s encouraged economists to follow the
academic literature (CS1). These economists were critical in the rapid
DHSS acceptance of “the idea of cost per QALY” (CS3). They con-
solidated this by commissioning a number of academic studies on the
application of the QALY to build a ﬁrm evidence base, a note from
Hurst to Smee for instance highlighting how:
As we cover more procedures and continue to improve our esti-
mates, we should gain more conﬁdence in raising questions about
the procedures lying at the extremes of the range with a view of
limiting the growth of the least cost-eﬀective procedures … (Note
from Hurst to Smee, 8 February 1985, DH Burnley,
OEA.056.001.009.V002, EAO Study – Cost of Saving Life)
As DH archives demonstrate, there was a signiﬁcant correspondence
between Jeremy Hurst (Economic Adviser) and Clive Smee (Chief
Economic Adviser in Health) regarding how QALYs could be im-
plemented (“How much can the NHS aﬀord to spend to save a life or to
avoid a severe disability” (ibid.)), the former emphasising that “the only
problem will be doing the research to generate the cost-eﬀectiveness
data” (Letter from Hurst to Mrs Joan Firth, 12 February 1985,
OEA.056.001.009. V002). Clive Smee added that the Economic
Advisers' Oﬃce “were by then commissioning evaluations all over the
place, looking at breast cancer screening” and other areas to build the
evidence (Interview).
For academic interviewees who had been involved in the DHSS-
funded QoL Measurement Group, they stressed the Department's wish
to coordinate the research. For example, one academic recalls being
told by a government economist:
He [the government economist] was quite worried that we were
undermining the work that they had put a lot of money into with
Rachel Rosser and subsequently. (A6)
Another academic researcher emphasised the tight Whitehall man-
agement:
[W]e were very closely monitored by the DH […]. There were very
deﬁned timelines and you can see from these minutes that they
asked us for extra information on part of the study that we provided.
There's an agreement that we would disseminate the work. So we
had to come with a publication strategy. I think it was partly be-
cause it was a lot of money. And also because they really had to
show that it had been done properly. It wasn't to fudge around the
edges. (A8)
Through these lengthy debates over issues such as which weightings
to base the index on, it is possible to see ongoing shifts in ‘coalitions’
between academics and civil servants. These led to signiﬁcant policy
outcomes, such as the decisions that “central tariﬀs should be based on
means not medians, [and] should be [applied to] the whole population
and not a sub-group’” (Minute of 1995 QoL measurement steering
group). It is unlikely that government economists working in isolation
from the academic community would have been able to develop such a
sophisticated tool. It required a constant dialogue, through working
groups, academic conferences, publications, and commissioning feasi-
bility studies. It also required a broader network between economists
and the medical profession, especially the senior medical civil service.
For instance, Clive Smee stressed the central role of Chief Medical
Oﬃcers, especially Ken Calman who “invented the term clinical eﬀec-
tiveness to mean clinical and cost-eﬀectiveness” and “then set up a
national screening committee to try and assess using cost per QALY type
calculations” (Interview). For Smee:
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that was one of the ﬁrst major clinical decisions that I remember
involving … it took for granted that there should be cost eﬀective-
ness.
The work of these government economists involved convincing
administrators and politicians of the beneﬁts of QALYs:
I was amazed at how quickly the Department accepted cost per
QALY and for a long time, we actually kept partly hidden from
ministers what we were doing in that area. (Clive Smee, interview)
5. Conclusion
This paper has constructed a history of the development and im-
plementation of the QALY concept and associated tools within UK
health policy, mobilising Multiple Streams Analysis. We have drawn on
previously unexploited archive sources and on semi-structured inter-
views to highlight how three ‘streams’ – policy, problems and politics –
were coupled by ‘policy entrepreneurs’, especially health economists
who moved between academia and Whitehall, to exploit the ‘window of
opportunity’ that opened in Britain following the 1970s economic crisis.
This was only possible because of the creation of, and investment in, a
health economics and operational research community, which
exploited funding and secondment opportunities. The adoption of
QALYs as a usable tool within DH and regional NHS was facilitated by
ongoing collaboration between academic and government health
economists. Despite apparent tensions over their respective roles, the
political pressure to produce a solution to the chronic NHS ﬁnancial
crises enabled an eﬀective working relationship. Although there were
no distinct breakthrough points for QALYs as with the creation of NICE
in 1999, the various events, networks and individuals we have dis-
cussed contributed to the slow build-up and embeddedness of the QALY
in the understanding of health and quality-of-life and the formulating of
healthcare solutions.
Explaining the various steps and challenges in the formulation of
QALYs, and how other options were side-lined, demonstrates that new
ideas do not get adopted because they are somehow ‘correct’ or because
they ‘speak truth to power’. Rather, through mobilising MSA, we argued
that ‘solutions’ are shaped by policy entrepreneurs negotiating ideas in
the three streams and pushing for the opening of a policy window to
allow change. This historical analysis foregrounds and legitimises the
explanatory role of more social factors such as personality and seren-
dipity and provides an alternative to health economists' favoured
technocratic explanations of policy adoption in their ﬁeld. This is im-
portant: the QALY concept is still central to healthcare decision-making,
especially the role of NICE, but to date there has been little analysis of
when and why it gained (and maintained) this authority. Likewise,
there has been relatively little discussion of why alternatives such as
Disability-Adjusted Life-Years (DALYs) or Healthy-Life Years (HYEs)
have failed to gain currency, at least in the UK. At a time when there is
renewed discussion over the authority of the pharmaceutical industry,
there is a real role for historians to play in supporting civil servants and
politicians to understand these choices, and thus to be able to eﬀec-
tively respond to a rapidly changing health policy environment. This
paper is a worked example of how to successfully employ MSA along-
side history to generate useful lessons for current policymakers. Key
ﬁndings include: the importance of engaging with appropriate experts
(including historians) in the development of new policy at an early
stage in the process; and the importance of relations and negotiations,
i.e. politics. More research is needed regarding QALYs' international
inﬂuence and whether such QoL concepts are compatible with local
practices and histories.
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